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Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?  
 
Reply to Justin Caouette 
 
Farah Focquaert & Maartje Schermer 
 
We would like to thank Justin Caouette for his interesting comments and for given us the 
opportunity to further clarify our views.  In his comments, Caouette addresses three points. First, 
he questions whether and why reflection and deliberation are necessary for authenticity of 
behavior. Caouette argues that we do not deliberate about everyday psychological changes (e.g. in 
our mood) either and that this is not a problem for the authenticity of our behavior, as long as we 
can still relate to such changes in some way, and can choose how to respond to them, and how to 
act. Our concern in the paper, however, is more with authenticity of personality and identity, 
than with isolated ‘behavior’. Actually, the point Caouette makes here with regard to behavior - 
that as long as we have the ability to ‘step back’ and reflect on ourselves, on our motivations, and 
choose to endorse or reject them, there is no problem of authenticity – comes close to the point 
that we have argued for in relation to identity.  
 
We agree that as long as we talk about relatively minor changes like ‘normal’ fluctuations in 
mood, for example, and a person remains, by and large, ‘himself’, with the same values, goals, 
desires and traits, he can indeed reflect on these changes, and choose how to respond to them, or 
how to act. However, we have argued that some passive, direct intervention may cause more 
radical changes, and these might affect the person to such an extent that he is, in a sense, not the 
same person anymore. If the intervention changes his values, desires, propensities or his outlook 
on life radically, then his authenticity as a person, the authenticity of his personal identity, is 
compromised. Caouette writes that even if certain ‘psychological states’ are implanted in us, ‘we’ 
remain the source of what we decide to do with our mental states. However, if ‘we’ ourselves 
have changed considerably, it is not clear anymore that our choices will really be authentically 
ours1. Moreover, we have argued that some passive interventions effectuate changes that a person 
is not aware of, and hence, cannot really reflect on or take a stance towards. If a person does not 
really notice he is in a lousy mood, he will not be able to choose how to deal with that or respond 
to it. That is why we have argued that concealed narrative identity changes are particularly 
problematic.  
 
Further on in his comment, when discussing identity, Caouette questions whether, and why, 
reflection and endorsement regarding the genesis of one’s desires, values and personality traits is 
                                                     
1 By the way, the idea that we will always have the power to just decide what we will do with our mental states, seems 
a simplification as well. People who are addicted, seriously depressed, manic etc. do not have the power to simply 
‘choose’ what to do. 
necessary for narrative identity. Here there appears to be another misunderstanding, since we do 
not claim it is necessary for having some sense of narrative identity, or for being able to tell a 
coherent story about one’s life, but for having an authentic narrative identity.  
Here it may help to explain that our conception of authenticity, and the one used by DeGrazia, is 
in line with a theoretical tradition of authors such as Frankfurt, Dworkin and Christman. In this 
line of thought a person is autonomous or authentic2 when he leads his life in accordance with 
his own goals and values, and his actions are authentic when he acts on preferences that are in 
line with his second order volitions, that are in turn consistent with his overall values and goals. 
Whether a person’s goals and values are truly his in the relevant sense, depends on whether he 
has endorsed them after rational reflection. Only endorsing certain values, however, is not by 
itself enough to make them truly ‘one’s own’. If it were, all forms of brainwashing, manipulation, 
subliminal suggestion and the like, that succeeded in making the person in question ‘endorse’ 
certain values and desires, would count as authentic. Dworkin called this ‘illegitimate influences’ 
and claimed that identification (or endorsement) should not itself be influenced in ways which 
make the process of identification alien to the individual. So, it matters how one’s endorsement 
came about: through the application of one’s own moral reasoning, or through external 
manipulation.  
 
We would like to focus the remainder of our reply on the third comment raised by Caouette. 
Given the fact that we already restrict the autonomy of individuals in prison and one of the goals 
of incarceration is to alter one’s moral compass, Justin Caouette argues that the concerns we 
voice with respect to forced (forced) direct interventions are overblown or even moot because 
‘we’ do not value the identity of those individuals who identify strongly with certain counter-
moral personality traits. One of the main goals of writing our article was to prevent unethical 
applications of passive interventions such as forced administration of direct neuro-interventions 
(for moral enhancement) within the criminal justice system. There are a lot of criticisms that 
come to mind when we read this section of his commentary, and we cannot discuss all of them 
within this space. We will focus on three main issues. 
 
First, who is the ‘we’ in the argument put forward by Caouette? Is it society or the criminal justice 
system or the philosophical community who does not value the identity of offenders with certain 
counter-moral identity traits? It is unclear to whom the ‘we’ refers and if this ‘we’ has any relevant 
authority or expertise with regard to punishment. Offenders are persons with basic human rights 
which need to be respected similar to the basic human rights of law-abiding citizens. For 
example, offenders have a basic human right to receive adequate health care, including mental 
health care, and a right to mental integrity. Offenders, even if the crimes they have done are 
horrific, should be treated with respect for their autonomy and identity insofar as the protection 
of society allows this. No harsher measures need to be taken than those that are sufficient to 
adequately protect society (Pereboom, 2014). Of course, in case of serious crimes or repeat 
offending, society has a duty to protect its citizens and adequate safety measures need to be 
taken, such as (potentially indefinite) confinement. However, forced (direct) interventions do not 
respect human dignity and autonomy, and may conflict with the ‘do no harm’ principle. We have 
                                                     
2 Unfortunately these terms are not used in the same way by different authors. 
not argued that either direct or passive interventions are never justified, but they should be 
voluntary (i.e. with informed consent). Farah Focquaert and Sigrid Sterckx have argued elsewhere 
which other conditions need to be met in order to render offering (direct) neuro-interventions to 
offenders ethically permissible (Focquaert, 2014; Focquaert & Sterckx, in press). Forced (direct 
and/or passive) neuro-interventions are generally ethically problematic.  
 
Autonomy can be defined in a variety of ways. Autonomy can focus on negative freedom, 
positive freedom, authenticity, empowerment, etc. It is true that we restrict offenders’ autonomy 
when we incarcerate individuals in the sense of taking away offenders individual liberty, which is 
a fundamental human right. In order to sanction offenders by incapacitating them, by taking away 
their individual liberty, governments need to make sure that no other sanctions would work 
equally well in addressing their goals. In general, due to today’s over-crowded prisons and the 
lack of available resources to provide adequate care, community-based sanctions are much less 
conducive to human rights violations then imprisonment and should therefore be the preferred 
option for most offenders provided that the rights of victims are upheld and the safety and 
concerns of society at large addressed (Focquaert & Raine, 2012).  
 
Second, reducing an individual to certain aspects of his/her being that are considered socially 
undesirable is a form of stigmatization. We fully agree that the moral wrongness of deviant 
behavior needs to be identified, but this need not be done by reducing individuals to certain 
aspects of their behavior and thereby labelling and stigmatizing individuals (e.g. as sexually violent 
predators). Such labeling and stigmatization also occurs when someone with obesity or an alcohol 
addiction gets reduced to his/her (medical) condition and gets portrayed in a negative way, or 
when signalling out individuals with serious infectious diseases as those who should be avoided at 
all cost.  
 
Only 15 to 25 percent of prisoners have psychopathy, and these individuals indeed suffer from a 
serious personality disorder exemplified by counter-moral traits. However, most offenders do not 
suffer from such a disorder and do not commit serious crimes such as murder, rape and physical 
assault, or massive fraud. It is one thing to say that we do not value counter-moral personality 
traits and/or behavior, but quite something else that we do not value the identity of individuals 
with certain counter-moral personality traits. If Caouette merely focuses on those offenders who 
strongly identify with such traits, his claim is limited to a small group of offenders of which some 
will identify with such traits continuously while others will be willing and able to change their 
future behavior. Most offenders however do not experience or identify their crimes as 
constitutive elements of their identity, nor can we regard this to be the case from a psychiatric or 
psychological perspective.  
 
Third, the argument on forced interventions that Caouette voices is set against the alternative of 
(mass) incarceration. It is our view that mass incarceration and the conditions under which many 
offenders are held today are not ethically warranted in themselves. For example, a major problem 
that prisoners face upon re-entry is that their time spent in prison has eroded their life both 
professionally (lack of training, loss of skills, limited or no employment opportunities), and 
privately (family and friends, emotional support networks in general, housing opportunities). 
Moreover, stigmatization acts as an indirect, enduring form of punishment that further aggravates 
the situation. Not surprisingly then, recidivism rates are extremely high. In fact, imprisonment is 
found to be counterproductive in terms of rehabilitation and reintegration in society for low-level 
offenders and for those in need of special care, such as individuals with mental health and 
substance abuse problems. Moreover, the long-term costs of imprisonment on offenders’ family 
members and communities are often neglected (Focquaert & Raine, 2012). Hence, we feel that 
neither mass incarceration nor forced interventions are the most effective and/or ethically 
acceptable means to address deviant behavior. The fact that incarceration may harm convicts – as 
Caouette agrees they do – is no reason to opt for other harmful interventions such as forced 
direct intervention, but to look for alternatives. 
 
A brief final note: like Elizabeth Shaw, Justin Caouette seems to have understood us as saying 
that direct interventions are always passive, and indirect interventions are active. As explained in 
our response to Shaw, this is not what we have claimed – but perhaps we have not been clear 
enough on that point, so we thank the commentators for giving us the opportunity to clarify 
ourselves!  
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On the Moral Permissibility of Passive Moral Enhancement* 
Comment on “Do Means Matter Morally?” 
Justin Caouette 
University of Calgary 
 
 
 
 
In this short response to Farah Focquaert and Maartje Schermer’s “Moral Enhancement: 
Do Means Matter Morally?” I’d like to focus on two general issues discussed in the paper 
regarding the use of direct, passive interventions to morally enhance subjects that have 
impairments in moral decision making and/or possess counter-moral personality traits. First, I’d 
like to consider the perceived threats to authenticity raised by the authors. I’ll argue that the 
threat is not apparent given that these enhancements, presently hypothetical as pointed out by the 
authors, do not determine their subjects to act in any particular way. Given that the subjects will 
still have free will, it is suspect to assume that the behaviour stemming from decisions after 
enhancement are not authentic. Next, I’ll briefly consider the threats that the authors raise 
regarding “concealed narrative identity changes”. I’ll suggest that these concerns might be 
overblown, though they are important to consider when thinking about the permissibility of 
direct, passive interventions. Lastly, I’d like to focus on the enhancement of criminal offenders. 
Given that we already restrict the autonomy of those in prison and given the goal of incarceration 
is to alter one’s moral compass, I will suggest that the concerns raised by the authors, even if not 
overblown, might be moot given that we do not value the identity of those who identify strongly 
with the counter-moral personality traits that these offenders exhibit.  
 
1. Threats to Authenticity 
 
Focquaert and Schermer argue that there is a morally relevant difference between what they 
call active and passive interventions. On their view, active interventions seem less likely to 
threaten identity and autonomy because of the nature of the intervention. Active, indirect 
interventions entail that the agent is involved in the process of changing their brain, which usually 
takes the form of therapy or moral education. This process is usually much longer and requires 
that the agent undergoing the change has room for rational reflection and deliberation about the 
changes that are under way, as well as an active engagement from the person undergoing the 
change. On the other hand, the authors indicate that direct, passive interventions create a greater 
cause for concern. Passive interventions (i.e DBS, TMS, and tDCS) have a greater potential to 
compromise identity and raise intrinsic doubts concerning authenticity and autonomy.3 It is 
claimed that this is so because without the active engagement from the person undergoing the 
DBI we bypass conscious reflection, continuous rational deliberation, and autonomous choice. 
This reflection, deliberation, and choice is assumed by the authors to be essential for the 
behaviour to be authentic to the enhanced subject. This assumption is what I’d like to hear more 
                                                     
3
 Nicole Vincent raises similar concerns in her article “Restoring Responsibility: promoting justice, therapy and 
reform through direct brain interventions”, Criminal Law and Philosophy (2014) 8: pages 21-42. 
 
about. Why think that directly altering an individual’s brain functioning bypass one’s authenticity? 
Let me offer some reasons to believe that the threat to authenticity might be overblown by the 
authors.  
 
First, is it the case that we ever deliberate about the psychological changes we find ourselves 
with from day to day? For instance, consider waking up in the morning and finding yourself edgy. 
We might reflect on why it is we are edgy, but after deliberating we might not find the source. 
This seems plausible. But just because we find ourselves edgy it doesn’t follow that we are forced 
to let that edginess win the day, so to speak. We can still deliberate and choose to do things that 
alter our mental state. We may try watching a comedy or listening to music that helps us 
overcome our edginess. We may decide to take a drug to remove the edge. These choices are 
available to us even though we have no idea why we are edgy. The point of bringing this to light 
is to show that a changed psychological state, even a state that we do not know the source of, 
does not determine us to act in any particular way. We are still the source of what we decide to 
do with our mental states. Even though finding ourselves edgy out of the blue will have an affect 
as to what actions will seem salient to us, it doesn’t cut off all of our options. And, given that we 
normally don’t choose what state we find ourselves in, the authenticity of our selves and the 
actions that flow out of us seems to be in tact. Similarly, if the cause of our edginess is the result 
of some direct, passive intervention, it doesn’t follow that what we decide to do about this is 
somehow inauthentic. External factors often put us in a variety of psychological states that we do 
not choose to be in. For these reasons I would like to hear more from the authors regarding why 
it is that direct, passive interventions pose any further threats to our authenticity than the external 
factors that often put us in a variety of psychological states.  
 
I believe authenticity is important when thinking about our actions. If an action is authentic, 
we must be the source of that action - it must be up-to-us, so to speak. But to use the language of 
authenticity with regards to our psychological states seems to raise a bunch of issues. If one 
admits that our psychological states are often altered and produced, in part, by external factors, 
then I think we need to hear more as to why direct, passive interventions pose greater risks to the 
authenticity in question. It seems that our actions can still be authentically ours even if some of 
the psychological states or newly implanted ethical alternatives are partly the cause of our action. 
After all, external factors often put us in a variety of psychological states but we do not think that 
the actions that arise from these states are inauthentic so why think that the actions that arise 
from a person that has been morally enhanced, given that many of these factors we are unaware 
of, are inauthentic? 
 
2. Threats to Identity 
 
The authors claim that “to be sufficiently aware of one’s narrative identity, a narrator must be 
able to coherently ‘explain’ or communicate the narrative unfolding of her life story”. I don’t 
want to challenge this claim. Instead, I’d like to raise some questions as to why it is that an 
individual enhanced directly via passive interventions cannot coherently explain or communicate 
the narrative unfolding of her life story. Let’s consider the case of Manuel.  
 
Manuel never acts morally; he is a person who doesn’t consider the feelings of others and 
takes pride when others point out to him that he is not a person who cares about the well-being 
of others. One night while sleeping, Manuel’s mom morally enhances him directly and passively 
in a way that makes him more empathetic and he is unaware of this enhancement. Manuel is 
aware of the change though: when he reflects on the person he is, much to his surprise, he finds 
himself caring about others more. Why does he lose the ability to speak to this change? And if he 
doesn’t, then why think his narrative identity is threatened? Is it typically the case that we know 
how and why our feelings change, or why we mature or have an epiphany?  
 
It is true that we may be able to tell a story as to why we change sometimes, pointing to some 
specific experience that gave rise to the change in feeling or disposition. However, this is often 
not the case. One might wake up by the side of their spouse whom they loved and wanted to be 
with all of the days prior to this one, but on this day could realize they do not want to be with 
them anymore. It happens quite often and sometimes occurs without the person changed 
knowing why. We can try to make sense of why we suddenly feel this way but it’s not clear to me 
that we can always know why. More importantly, this lack of knowledge doesn’t seem to threaten 
our narrative identity. As long as we have the ability to endorse or choose not to endorse the way 
we feel at a certain time it seems that our narrative identity is in tact.  
 
In sum, the authors endorse DeGrazia’s theory of personal narrative which they describe as 
depending on two things: “whether the person identifies with her new traits or desires; and 
whether she identifies with their genesis, i.e., the way they came about.” But I’d like to hear more 
as to why this second condition must be met. In other words, why should we buy DeGrazia’ss 
theory? Why isn’t enough to meet the first condition to say that we have a narrative identity?  
 
I believe abrupt changes can be incorporated into one’s narrative. And further, that identity 
should be understood as a cohesive narrative. One can identify with their new self as a direct 
result of the DBI that was forced on them due to choices they made. Further, if one believes that 
the self is dynamic and always changing with new experiences this would not be a big bullet to 
bite. This would require that they have knowledge of the intervention; however, it doesn’t follow 
that they must have consented to it in order for it to be incorporated into one’s narrative. It is a 
part of my narrative identity that my two parents raised me and that I was punched by a bully in 
middle school. But I didn’t consent to either. Similarly, one who has been morally enhanced 
might be more moral (which would be a distinct difference to the person who didn’t care about 
morality prior to the enhancement) and might understand that this is a result of the state forced 
DBI imposed on them from their own transgressions. This is not problematic because they 
would still have memories of their past self and those memories, and coupled with their new take 
on moral situations, this would give rise to a distinct self. So, while these new salient moral 
decisions might seem alien, they could easily identify with them and endorse them once they 
recognize that their new found moral awareness will open doors human flourishing that had 
previously been closed. Further, such drastic changes to one’s self is no different (morally 
speaking) from many transformative experiences that we often go through without consent (I’d 
point to the work of Laurie Paul as evidence for these sort of situations).  
 
3. Direct, Passive Enhancement on Criminals 
 Before concluding I would like to turn to a specific case of moral enhancement, the 
enhancement of convicted criminals. For example, let’s consider DBI’s that aim to morally 
enhance persons convicted of a crime. The authors present concerns related to a person’s 
autonomy, authenticity, and identity, which in turn raises serious doubts about the moral 
permissibility of such interventions in general. But, given that many who will need these 
enhancements are likely to be the criminal population, I wonder if their concerns apply to a 
population that already has limited autonomy and whose identities we do not respect.4 Here I’m 
thinking of the person who identifies as a rapist or a person that identifies as the type of person 
who will assault another for looking at them “funny”. Do we respect such identities? Do we care 
if folks cannot recognize themselves as those types of people anymore if they were morally 
enhanced? It’s doubtful. Even if we admit that a convict’s self is abruptly and drastically changed 
this need not trouble us. Implemented properly, DBI’s can bring about benefits for society at 
large and/or for the convict themselves. Next, even if we agree that abrupt changes to the 
convict might be alter their identity, this abruptness of change need not be considered negative, 
especially for those individuals who identify with harmful and criminal behaviours. Why value the 
identity of someone who identifies as a racist or as someone who beats women (assuming they 
have been convicted of crimes relating to these world views)? We already restrict the scope of a 
convict’s autonomy when sentencing them to prison or mandated rehabilitation. We do this 
because we deem that identifying as such is not a worthy identification. And further, if someone 
identifies with morally bankrupt traits we try our best to eradicate them, short of methods that 
could harm the criminal. I would be interested to hear from the authors whether making 
someone morally better can be considered harming them.  
 
Further, we could ask why think that the direct, passive method is worse? Comparing 
traditional rehabilitative methods or active, indirect interventions, it seems an argument can be 
made that both are just as likely to cause problems to identity in criminal offenders. In fact, there 
might be more reasons to be concerned with the longer process when thinking about identity and 
autonomy. Change likely occurs in both active and passive interventions, however, in the case of 
active interventions, changes are accompanied by some negative side effects (which are less likely 
to occur with passive, direct interventions). Given the amount of time that convicts spend with 
others who are not committed to changing their behaviour, this forces those who might take an 
active role in their cognitive changes to build defense mechanisms that also shape who they are. 
Given that these mechanisms can become part of one’s character, it’s worth investigating how 
much this can negatively affect their future relationships and life plans. It doesn’t seem far 
fetched to assume that the active, indirect interventions carry possible harms to the criminal 
offender that direct, passive interventions do not. This suggests that  direct, passive interventions 
might be a better choice when considering all the pros and cons when deciding how to 
rehabilitate or morally enhance our convicted felons who identity as rapists, racists, and those 
quick and ready to assault folks who pose no physical threat to others.  
 
                                                     
4
 Bublitz and Merkel consider this population in their 2014 paper “Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, 
Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination”, Criminal Law and Philosophy 8: 51-77. 
In conclusion, not being allowed to pursue one’s interests (because of incarceration and 
limited freedoms more generally) would seem to have a much stronger negative effect on the self 
than do direct, passive interventions. Having desires that cannot be fulfilled forces one to have a 
constant sense that their life is unfulfilled and can lead to depression and other mental disorders. 
Thus, having a severely restricted set of options to pursue because of forced rehabilitation or 
incarceration seems to be a harm that may be lessened with the use of direct, passive 
interventions due to the abrupt nature of these latter interventions. Given that one of the main 
goals of incarceration is rehabilitation, it seems that direct, passive intervention could be better at 
accomplishing this goal, even if we admit that one may be alienated from their prior non-moral 
self. Direct, passive interventions can alter one’s brain so that moral choices become salient or 
live options. This should be seen as a positive rather than a negative effect on one’s autonomy. 
The moral options are now live, but, they are not forced and thus their decision to endorse their 
new moral inclinations keeps their authenticity and personal narrative in tact. Affording one the 
opportunity to flourish seems better than hoping that one can come to some realization that they 
should see some moral action as a live option to them, especially when the track record of active 
traditional rehabilitation is so poor. Replacing IBI’s with DBI’s might allow us to extend their 
autonomy rather than stunt it, contra the suggestion by the authors. The abrupt change in one’s 
cognitive apparatus might allow for them to be released much earlier than they normally would, 
given that the aims of the rehabilitation would have been met. I’d like to hear more from the 
authors regarding enhancing directly, and passively in the context of criminal rehabilitation. After 
all, this is the population that is most ripe for the implantation of such interventions.  
 
 
*I’d like to thank David Boutland, who is my coauthor on an unfinished paper where we discuss 
many of these issues. 
 
 
 
 
